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Where can I find a man who has forgotten words, so I can have a word with him?
Zhuangzi (Watson 2003, p. 141)
Why another article on logos and dao 道? Is it not the case that enough scholars have 
looked into the similarities between the term logos and the notion of dao? Although 
it may seem so, I will argue that when another perspective is employed, logos and 
dao might fruitfully be compared on a different level from the one used by most of 
these comparisons. In this essay I will argue first that in many instances the approach 
of some of the scholars who have compared logos and dao has been one-sided and 
has mostly consisted in a comparison of these two key notions that has sought to 
portray both notions as denoting some kind of metaphysical principle underlying the 
processes that make up our world. Second, I will provide an alternative to this ap-
proach to logos, and consequently to dao, using Heidegger’s interpretations of logos. 
I will then show that the Daoists’ intentions for the term dao compare well with 
Heidegger’s views, and argue that such a non-metaphysical interpretation is much 
closer to both Heidegger and Daoism. I end by arguing that reinterpretations of clas-
sical notions such as offered here can provide a valuable resource to comparative 
philosophy, in the sense that Heidegger’s way of reading Heraclitus, and Heidegger’s 
work in general, offer a viable alternative approach to comparative thinking that does 
not succumb to the metaphysical inclinations inherent in so much of the Western 
tradition, and as such could coalesce with the largely non-metaphysical tradition of 
classical Chinese thought and provide avenues for further comparisons.
Introduction
The ancient Greek notion of logos has been a longtime favorite among comparative 
scholars looking for a term to translate dao. After all, there are, at least on the surface, 
similarities between the two notions: both can mean ‘speaking’, ‘discourse’, or ‘lan-
guage’, and both refer to some kind of pattern or regularity in the world. Also, both 
logos and dao seem in a way ‘desirable’. In early Western thought we are taught by 
Heraclitus to listen not to him but to the logos, and in classical Chinese thought ‘hav-
ing’ dao means that one has reached the highest possible goal in life.
Comparisons of logos and dao have more often than not resulted in understand-
ing both notions as transcendental or metaphysical principles. In religious studies, 
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such comparisons or translations of dao as logos or even as ‘God’ are commonplace, 
since they both seem to have to do with the word bringing order, and with a higher 
transcendent being or guiding principle having provided the word. Such compari-
sons have overflowed to comparative philosophy, thus reinforcing and perpetuating 
the idea that Daoism is about some transcendental metaphysical entity or principle 
inadequately named dao.1 An example of this kind of comparison is Thomas Leung, 
who, seeking to understand dao as the underlying ultimate process or ultimate truth, 
and logos as the ultimate order of things, accordingly finds many connections be-
tween the two: “The changing world is a process following some forms or order. 
The Tao and Logos are those kinds of order. . . . Both describe the ultimate reality of 
the world as infinite within the finite or eternality within the flux of changing. . . . 
Both identify the human heart-mind or soul with the ultimate reality” (Leung 1998, 
p. 144).
Although the extent to which Leung subscribes to it is unclear, what is clear is 
that dao and logos seen in this way have a definite metaphysical tone. An even 
 clearer example can be found in Benjamin Schwartz, who speaks of Daoism as “a 
kind of speculative meditation . . . on the nature of Tao that seems to parallel later 
Neoplatonic meditations in the West on the nature of the Logos” (Schwartz 1975, 
p. 65). More recently, Ashok Gangadean has argued that
it becomes apparent that the vast spectrum of diverse cultural and philosophical narrative 
attempts through the ages to name and express “What is First” converge on the same 
Primal Infinite Source. For example, the discourse of TAO in classical Chinese thought is 
one magnificent attempt at “First Philosophy” — the enterprise of developing a grammar 
and narrative to express the most fundamental Reality. (Gangadean 2004)
Interpretations such as these, assuming that we are all looking for that elusive ‘First 
Philosophy’, or ‘First Ground’, have inadvertently set up an understanding of logos as 
indeed qualifying as such a metaphysical ground, or Reason, and this is also the 
standard interpretation of logos. As such, many comparative philosophers have 
thankfully taken the parallel that Schwartz propounds and found ways of inserting 
the metaphysical values associated with this traditional understanding of logos into 
Daoist philosophy. For example, Yü Ying-shih has argued that “If the ‘Idea of the 
Good’ has made Plato the father of ‘otherworldliness in the west,’ then Chuang-tzu 
on account of his conception of Tao in the ‘realm beyond’ also deserves to be called 
‘the father of otherworldliness in China’” (Yü 1985, p. 175).2 If it is generally ac-
cepted that Confucius and the ensuing Confucian tradition are not metaphysical in 
their core teachings, then it seems that many commentators have understood the 
Daoist tradition, which is after all in large parts a criticism of Confucianism, to entail 
a definite metaphysical slant, not unlike the Western tradition, but usually seen as too 
‘mystical’ to count as ‘real’ metaphysics.3
Sticking to such a traditional metaphysical explanation of both logos and dao, 
we might indeed perceive similarities. When one starts with the intention to under-
stand both logos and dao as metaphysical principles or first grounds, similarities will 
naturally ensue, since such metaphysical principles inevitably share similarities that 
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make them metaphysical principles in the first place. And there have been many 
philosophers in both Western and Asian traditions who, while not necessarily being 
comparative scholars, nevertheless have understood either logos or dao, or both, in 
this way.
Different Logos, Different Dao
Although we all know that at least within the Western philosophical tradition a total 
escape from metaphysics may be impossible, and Heidegger (but also, for example, 
Derrida) acknowledges this,4 I will show that when comparing Daoism with Hei-
degger’s ideas on logos we find a very different understanding of logos that is not 
metaphysical in nature, in other words an interpretation where logos is not seen as a 
principle that stands above and in some way governs the world as we know it. And 
further, such a non-metaphysical understanding of logos as Heidegger will show us 
can be fruitfully compared with a similar non-metaphysical interpretation of dao. We 
can safely say that Laozi and Zhuangzi did not have to agitate against a metaphysical 
tradition in the first place, as Heidegger had to. Yet I will argue that in their reaction 
to the Confucian and Mohist traditions against which they did agitate, a number of 
relevant similarities to Heidegger’s non-metaphysical approach can be found. The 
result, I venture, is a similar kind of thinking in Heidegger and Daoism. I thus whole-
heartedly agree when similarities between the two concepts of logos and dao are 
noted, but I think the similarities are different, and by giving a different interpretation, 
based on textual evidence, I try to put both Heidegger and Daoism in a different 
light.
A notion of caution should be inserted here. I am by no means arguing that the 
Confucian tradition against which most of the Daoist thinkers agitated was a meta-
physical tradition in the sense that I understand the Western tradition to be. There is 
general agreement that this is not the case and that the classical Chinese thinkers 
were working with a set of background assumptions sufficiently different from 
those thinkers in the Western history of philosophy. Yet I will argue that Zhuangzi’s 
thought shares enough characteristics with Heidegger to warrant a close comparison. 
One may definitely say that Heidegger was trying to think in a non-metaphysical 
way in reaction to the dominant metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy, but 
the fact that Zhuangzi was thinking in a non-metaphysical way did not arise out of 
a genuine need to overcome a metaphysical opponent. Yet whichever way we label 
it, my intention is to make clear that regardless of their respective backgrounds, 
both thinkers are after a way of thought that is squarely located in this world, op-
posed to dualism, and that has no need for metaphysical principles. In what follows, 
Heidegger’s re interpretation of Heraclitus should also be understood in this way. 
We shall see that Heidegger argues that Heraclitus was not a metaphysical thinker 
in the first place, since the particular form of metaphysics that we are discussing 
here did not arise until Plato.5 This reinterpretation of Heraclitus by Heidegger can 
show us some very interesting things about the possible connections between the 
early Greek thinkers and the classical Chinese thinkers. Such connections are based 
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on understanding both the pre-Socratics and the classical Chinese thinkers as non- 
metaphysical.
To come back to the comparison, one of the first and obvious similarities (in any 
comparison of the two notions) must be that both dao and logos seem to have a 
 double meaning. Both can, in broad ways, be said to mean ‘speaking’, ‘discourse’, as 
well as to refer to some kind of ‘ground’ or ‘grounding’. And both Heidegger and the 
Daoists seem to see another kind of double meaning in the words: for Daoism there 
are individual daos and a bigger Dao. And Heidegger perceives Heraclitus to be 
talking about a human logos understood as attempting to get in tune or in line with 
the bigger Logos (Heidegger 1994a, pp. 296–329). My use of capital letters here 
should not confuse us into believing that we are reifying the terms into substances or 
anything like that. Before we draw such hasty conclusions, it might be best to first 
delve into the similarity in terms of language that seems apparent in how Heidegger 
and the Daoists understand logos and dao respectively, followed by a deeper expla-
nation of what Heidegger thinks logos is and what the Daoists think dao stands for.
Logos and Dao as Experience with and of Language
Since logos and dao both mean ‘discourse’ or ‘speaking’, we must consider how 
both Heidegger’s logos and dao point to a different understanding of language. 
Heidegger, Laozi, and Zhuangzi have all argued against the commonsense notions of 
language and its possibilities, against its literal interpretations, yet I think none of 
them have argued against language per se. This is vital for my point since I think that 
in comparative philosophy, and thus in the understanding of such terms as logos and 
dao, language is an integral and vital part of our way of understanding. Yet the meta-
physical way of understanding has a specific view on and use of language. Heidegger 
and Daoism both put forward a different idea of language that challenges metaphys-
ical notions of presence, of reference and representation.
The importance of language lies exactly in the fact that it is our vehicle for think-
ing, but that metaphysical (or Confucian) language prohibits certain ways of thinking 
and tends to make artificial distinctions. It is thus not a question of leaving the vehicle 
behind (this would really be another form of metaphysics where we think we have 
some overarching principle outside of language), but of understanding how it func-
tions, what it does and can do, while fully inhabiting the various possibilities that 
languages afford us. As Heidegger says:
What if the language of metaphysics and metaphysics itself, whether it is that of the living 
or of the dead god, in fact constituted, as metaphysics, that limit which prevents a transi-
tion over the line, i.e., the overcoming of nihilism? If this were the case, would not cross-
ing the line then necessarily have to become a transformation of our saying and demand 
a transformed relation to the essence of language? (Heidegger 1998, p. 306; italics in 
original)
Aside from the fact that this quote (rightly, I think) suggests that nihilism is only a 
function and problem of still thinking within the confines of the metaphysical tradi-
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tion, it also means that we should leave behind language as the discourse of repre-
sentation. We should no longer talk about the world in propositional statements, 
but rather return to the language of Saying (Sage), which speaks from Being. Yet 
Heidegger is well aware that all language, including his own, is subject to the restric-
tions and dangers inherent in language:
[T]he word itself already reveals something (known) and thereby conceals that which 
should be brought into openness in thoughtful Saying. This difficulty cannot be removed 
by anything; indeed, even the attempt to do so already means the failure to appreciate all 
Saying of Being. This difficulty must be undertaken and understood in its essential belong-
ing (to thinking Being). (Heidegger 1989, p. 83; my translation)
Language might be considered an obstacle, yet it is a necessary obstacle and as such 
a possibility of which we must be aware, and which we must not shun to employ to 
its fullest. What we must seek to get rid of, if that is at all possible, is a one-sided view 
and use of language, in favor of a much more encompassing view.
A similar understanding of language is readily found in Daoism. The Zhuangzi 
especially is full of messages of a similar kind, like the passages in chapter 2 that re-
gard the acceptability or non-acceptability of propositional language as superficial 
and wrongheaded and claim that following dao overcomes this duality by not adher-
ing to fixed representational schemes. Following any fixed representational or prop-
ositional scheme “obscures” or “hides” dao by installing artificial ideas of right and 
wrong.6 Ames and Hall, commenting on chapter 23 and the suspicion of language in 
the Daodejing, put a similar view across:
The philosophical problem that provokes the Daoist mistrust of language lies in the pos-
sibility that a misunderstanding of the nature of language has the potential to promote the 
worst misconceptions about the flux and flow of experience in which we live our lives. 
There is an obvious tension between the unrelenting processual nature of experience and 
the function of language to separate out, isolate, and arrest elements within it. (Ames and 
Hall 2003, p. 113)
Heidegger and the Daoists are extremely aware of this tension and of the necessity 
of language, and in their own way argue for an opening up of language to its own 
possibilities, rather than remaining in its limited metaphysical field. Language is not 
denied, but a certain idea and use of language, the metaphysical or propositional and 
representational use, is denied dominance and superiority over other avenues. This 
is why it is usually said that dao is ‘nameless’ or ‘cannot be named’. No halting or 
arresting of the process, be it the metaphysical propositional way or the Confucian 
‘naming’ and ‘rectification of names’ way, can do justice to the process.
Let me substantiate this with an example. I would like to reinterpret the first 
chapter of the Daodejing according to J.J.L. Duyvendak’s interpretation, which con-
ceives of dao as the process of change. As he says, dao “is not a First Cause, it is not 
a Logos. It is nothing but the process of change and growth” (Duyvendak 1954, p. 9). 
Although ‘Logos’ here is obviously used in the metaphysical sense, and not accord-
ing to Heidegger’s reinterpretation, this quote still shows us that the metaphysical 
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principle is denied. The difference in the translation by Duyvendak (especially of the 
character chang 常) with standard readings is substantial,7 as it makes for a different 
reading. It is very different whether you say, in the standard version, “the dao which 
can be spoken of is not the constant dao” or whether you take seriously Duyvendak’s 
translation, which has “the Way that may truly be regarded as the Way is other than 
a permanent Way” (Duyvendak 1954, p. 17). It is the ‘other than permanent’ aspect 
of this interpretation that brings to it a decidedly non-metaphysical ring. The theme 
of constancy and especially the way in which it is interpreted can reveal a meta-
physical inclination toward seeing dao as an unchanging guiding principle behind 
the myriad things, whereas seeing dao as the process of change itself proposes to 
undo that metaphysical idea. The standard version seems to suggest that although not 
effable, there is indeed a constant and eternal way. Duyvendak’s suggestion is that 
what can be considered as dao is not a permanent thing.
Duyvendak’s translation has the further merit of making good sense of the par-
allel structure of the first twelve characters of chapter 1 of the Daodejing, and we 
know that the form of the Daoist classics is important in understanding meaning, in 
that poetry and verse have definite functions. If names are not constant, and the 
whole Daoist tradition suggests that we should indeed see language as provisional, 
then what is the point of speaking of the ‘Real’ or ‘constant’ name? There is no such 
thing. And if we follow the parallel structure, then the same thing would go for dao. 
Since daos are not constant, there is no reason why there should be an overarching 
constant dao other than the whole process of wanwu, or the myriad things.
The differences between these interpretations show that a different translation 
can easily import a way of thinking that is foreign to the text translated. Heidegger 
was well aware of this, and in my opinion this is what informs his particular readings 
of the ancient Greeks. With this I turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of logos.
Heidegger’s Logos
It is imperative to notice first that Heidegger himself did not attempt to translate dao 
with logos. Heidegger was content with the more traditional ‘way’ as translation, 
since this term was an important one in much of his own work.8 He even called his 
Gesamtausgabe “Wege, nicht Werke,” or “Ways, not works”.
But let us start with an attempt to understand clearly what Heidegger means 
when he speaks about logos. If we do so correctly, then there will be a definite con-
nection between ‘way’ and logos. Heidegger spends a lot of time in his Heraclitus 
volume explaining that only in the metaphysical way of seeing things with its idio-
matic logic can logos be thought of in its capacity as ‘reason’, ‘proposition’, or ‘ratio-
nality’. It is only in that particular history that such an interpretation could have come 
about.
But originarily, logos means something else. Heidegger thinks of logos as how 
Being functions as ground, in the sense that Being grounds beings, but also in the 
sense that beings ground Being:
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Being becomes present as logos in the sense of ground, of allowing to let lie before us. 
The same logos, as the gathering of what unifies, is the   Eν [Én]. . . . The logos grounds and 
gathers everything into the universal, and accounts for and gathers everything in terms of 
the unique. (Heidegger 1974, p. 69)
It is apparent that Heidegger wants to understand such a ground not as a metaphysi-
cal principle but as consisting of the interplay between beings coming together in 
being different, in more process-oriented ways. To see this, we must note that Hei-
degger connects logos to a host of other pivotal words, such as ‘gathering’, ‘Saying’, 
‘Auseinandersetzung’, ‘polemos’, and ‘clearing’, and we will only get a good grip on 
the term if we follow these connections. In Vorträge und Aufsätze Heidegger reinter-
prets λγο (logos) from the Greek verb λγειν (legein, to gather, to say) as “the Laying 
that gathers” (die lesende Lege) (Heidegger 1994b, p. 208; 1975, p. 66), thinking 
with this term that which consists of gathering together and letting things be in letting 
them lie before us:
Thus is Λγο named without qualification:  Λγο, the Laying: the pure letting-lie- 
together-before of that which of itself comes to lie before us, in its lying there. In this 
fashion Λγο occurs essentially as the pure laying which gathers and assembles. Λγο 
is the original assemblage of the primordial gathering of the primordial Laying.   O Λγο 
is the Laying that gathers [die Lesende Lege], and only this. (Heidegger 1994b, pp. 207–
208; 1975, p. 66)
This gathering laying, is connected by Heidegger to μολογεν (homologein) 
(Saying the same), which
occurs when the hearing of mortals has become proper hearing. When such a thing 
 happens something fateful comes to pass. Where, and as what, does the fateful presence 
[come to pass]? Heraclitus says: μολογεν σοφν στιν   Eν Πντα, “the fateful comes to 
pass in as far One All.” (Heidegger 1994b, p. 210; 1975, p. 68)9
Begging your pardon for the potentially confusing translations of Heideggerian 
 jargon, which is even worse in English than it is in German, the point is clear enough. 
Heidegger thinks that when we are attuned to (properly hearing) logos, we will 
 understand that one (is) all and our saying will be in tune with all that is. But Hei-
degger warns us that we should not superficially take this as ‘all is one’, or ‘one is 
all’.   Eν Πντα is the same as logos; it is the gathering of all into one gathering. It is 
not a matter of making all different things into one, but homologein is understood as 
Einverständnis.10 This means agreement with, accordance with, and as such can be 
taken to mean that rather than seeing everything as one, we should see everything as 
being different, but in accordance. This is what Heidegger thinks Heraclitus means 
by ‘listening to logos’: Being attuned to the belonging together, the gathering of dif-
ferences in their accordance.
In Holzwege Heidegger also translates logos as ‘gathering’ (Versammlung) 
(Heidegger 1994c, p. 327). In his typical idiom Heidegger tries to release logos from 
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its metaphysical translations, such as reason, ratio, or even God. While Heidegger 
retains the idea that logos means ‘saying’ or ‘speaking’, ‘discourse’, he offers his 
 other interpretation as something even more or at least equally originary. Doing so 
he brings the connection between language and logos to a deeper understanding. 
Logos can then be interpreted as the discourse that gathers things together, while 
letting them be what they are in their difference. This is the discourse that is in tune 
with Being, with how things are. This logos was what the ancient Greeks lived in — 
their language was alive in this way — but they never thought through this situation 
themselves. As Heidegger says:
 O Λγο, thought as the Laying that gathers, would be the essence [Wesen] of saying 
[die Sage] as thought by the Greeks. Language would be saying. Language would be 
the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing. In fact, the Greeks 
dwelt in this essential determination of language. But they never thought it — Heraclitus 
included. (Heidegger 1994a, p. 220; 1975, p. 77)11
With this Heidegger tries to urge us into another idea and usage of language. In the 
dialogue with the Japanese thinker in Unterwegs zur Sprache he perceives language 
as ‘Saying’ (Sage). Although Saying and logos can be read in close proximity to 
speech, for Heidegger the essence of language lies as much in being silent and listen-
ing as it does in speaking. In this way logos, this Greek word that was wrongly trans-
lated into the Latin ‘Ratio’, or rationality, would actually mean ‘Saying’, understood 
as a kind of showing that lets things be. In Heidegger’s words, “The oldest word for 
the rule of the word thus thought, for Saying, is logos: Saying which, in showing, lets 
beings appear in their ‘it is’” (Heidegger 1971b, p. 155). So logos is connected to a 
certain form of speaking, speech, or, better even, a certain way of using language that 
would do justice to the way things are. For example, instead of saying that man is the 
rational animal, we can change this (inadequate) translation of zoon logon echon 
into: man, the animal that inherently has logos, the discourse that lets things be seen 
as they are. Seen together with the earlier notion of logos as ‘gathering’, humankind 
in its deepest reality is dia-logos, dialogue, and this dialogue Heidegger understands 
as Auseinandersetzung, a term I will refer to later.
What Heidegger thinks with logos as ‘gathering in letting be’ should not be 
 understood as a metaphysical principle guiding all things. ‘Gathering’ is first of all 
not to be read as a noun or substance; it is not ‘a’ gathering, even less ‘the’ gathering. 
This word should be read much more in a gerund or verb-like sense, as it hints at 
a temporal phenomenon, a process rather than a static principle. Seen in this way 
logos would then mean (as a sort of preliminary definition) ‘temporary and ongoing 
gathering of things in their difference through language’. In other words logos would 
show ‘how things hang together’; it would show how things are laid out with respect 
to each other. Logos, then, is very much a relational idea, where the most important 
feature lies in gathering seemingly unrelated things, events, and ourselves into a 
more originary unity, while not dissolving differences. Logos shows how things are 
related to each other, and lets things show themselves as such.
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We should be mindful here of other words in Heidegger’s vocabulary like 
 Auseinandersetzung and das Selbe, ‘con-frontation’ and ‘the same’, respectively, to 
realize how this gathering together and letting be of differences can go together. 
Heidegger more than once explicitly related logos to what he calls Auseinander-
setzung, or con-frontation, or πλεμο (polemos). One instance where he does so is 
in his reinterpretation of Heraclitus. Heraclitus is well known for having allegedly 
said in fragment 53 that “war is the father of all things.” Or so the tradition goes. 
Heidegger thinks that this interpretation is mistaken or at least one-sided. There is 
again a more originary way of looking at the fragment, which starts with πλεμο 
πντων μν πατρ εσ̉τι. Heidegger translates: “Con-frontation (Auseinandersetzung) 
is indeed the begetter of all (that comes to presence)” (Maly and Emad 1986, p. 41).12 
This already signals a substantial difference from normal translations, but even more 
important is the continuing sentence, which is usually left out in normal translations: 
“. . . πντων  δβασιλε,” which Heidegger translates as “but (also) the dominant 
preserver of all” (ibid., p. 41).13 Looking at this translation we can see that Heidegger 
is far from trying to say that ‘war’ is the father of all things, but rather says that 
con-frontation, as Auseinandersetzung, is the begetter and keeper of all things. Since 
confrontation and Auseinandersetzung both imply the interplay of different things, 
this difference and the interaction of differences become extremely important.
Elsewhere Heidegger explicitly names polemos as ‘clearing’ (die Lichtung) 
(Heidegger 1994a, pp. 269; 1975, p. 119), making it resonate with one of the key 
terms of his later thinking. So exactly what is it that this Auseinandersetzung implies? 
What Heidegger means by Auseinandersetzung is an encounter of the Self and the 
Other, but we must first learn to let go of the assertively polemical connotations that 
often accompany the word confrontation, or, rather, read them in a different way. 
We have already seen that Heidegger thinks of polemos not just as polemic; it is 
 really the difference that is meant also by ‘clearing’ (Lichtung), which can be under-
stood as the opening that provides for the unconcealment of things. The starting point 
and the end point of an Auseinandersetzung must be difference. Lichtung, or clear-
ing, is originally an open space in the woods where light is being let in. That opening 
is only such because of the trees that surround it. Thus the understanding is that the 
two opposites of the difference must always work together, are always already con-
nected in some vital way.
This is where Heidegger’s understanding of das Selbe (the same) can be of help. 
We should avoid trying to make things identical (what Heidegger calls das Gleiche), 
but we should treat them as being similar in a different way, which translates 
 Heidegger’s idea of the ‘same’ (das Selbe). As he says: “But the same is not the 
merely identical. In the merely identical, the difference disappears. In the same the 
dif ference appears . . .” (Heidegger 1974, p. 45). The ‘same’ is not some  metaphysical 
construct; it is not an overarching concept, but only functions because of difference. 
This is how the ‘same’, homologein, and logos are connected. Logos then consists of 
the gathering of things in their difference through attuned discourse. It denotes a 
unity that is made up solely of the interplay of differences. As Heidegger puts it:
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The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent oneness of 
what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves toward the absence of dif-
ference, so that everything may be reduced to a common denominator. The same, by 
contrast, is the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the dif-
ference. We can only say “the same” if we think difference. (Heidegger 1971a, p. 216)
This means that Heidegger’s thought should not be understood as a form of dialec-
tics. The important difference is that the movement or interplay of differences is  never 
superseded in an overarching synthesis. The play of differences does not move to-
ward some goal; it just moves. Logos traditionally stands for constancy, permanence, 
rationality, and eternal principles, but we have now seen that Heidegger understands 
logos as polemos. This means that difference and the interplay of differences is con-
stitutive for any constancy, which would be relative to this more originary play. 
Con-frontation or Auseinandersetzung is the more originary ‘begetter’ of things. In 
connection with this he says, in the Introduction to Metaphysics:
Thus Being, logos, as the gathered harmony, is not easily available for everyone at the 
same price, but is concealed, as opposed to that harmony which is always a mere equal-
izing, the elimination of tension, levelling. (Heidegger 2000, p. 141)
Logos in Heidegger’s view is not about reducing differences, but about celebrating or 
embracing them. Being happens only in the interplay of differences, and logos and 
polemos are exactly that kind of ‘gathering’ of differences.
To give another illustration of what I am trying to get at, we must remember that 
the star was Heidegger’s favorite light metaphor. The star is light, but light in dark-
ness, arising out of darkness. Stars are only visible when it is dark. And the Lichtung 
is only such in the surrounding darkness. Thus, the polemos or Auseinandersetzung 
between dark and light, between different forces, is more important to Heidegger 
than the metaphysical focus on light. In other words, Heidegger stays true to the idea 
that unconcealing only happens within concealing. And it is this ongoing process 
between unconcealing and concealing that he tries to convey with the word logos. 
In the Introduction to Metaphysics he puts it in the following way: “Confrontation 
(Auseinandersetzung) does not divide unity, much less destroy it. It builds unity; it is 
the gathering (logos). Polemos and logos are the same” (Heidegger 2000, p. 65).14
Logos, together with Auseinandersetzung, aletheia, physis, and other such key-
words from the ancient Greek language, are most important to Heidegger. There are 
numerous places where he speaks of these ancient Greek terms in their relatedness, 
going so far as to say they are the same. Logos is polemos, is aletheia, is physis, is 
moira. These are all interrelated and eventually point to that which cannot be spoken 
of as a being, that is, Being. As Heidegger says:
[T]he Λγο which Heraclitus thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the 
Μορα which Parmenides thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Χρεν 
which Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing — all these name the Same. In the 
concealed richness of the Same the unity of the unifying One, the   Eν, is thought by each 
thinker in his own way. (Heidegger 1975, p. 56)15
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Logos and Auseinandersetzung are, in Heidegger’s way, really the ‘same’, since both 
focus on the coming together of differences in their differing. Relating this back to 
comparative philosophy, in this way self and other are always already related in a 
fundamental way, because “only where the foreign is known and acknowledged in 
its essential oppositional character (Gegensätzlichkeit) does there exist the possibility 
of a genuine relationship (Beziehung), that is, of a uniting that is not a confused 
 mixing but a conjoining in distinction (Unterscheidung)” (Heidegger 1996, p. 54; 
German added). It is thus a matter, as Florian Vetsch mentioned, not of seeing an other 
culture as a “sum of learnable data” (Vetsch 1992, p. 80; my translation) that you 
can then take home, but of learning to see another culture as a living, historically 
moving, open-ended totality, which is not readily at one’s disposal, but always open 
to renewed conversation.16 This is also a part of the Auseinandersetzung. In this way 
the relation between different cultures is then literally a never-ending story. Logos is 
really continuous Auseinandersetzung, polemos, because it is in this way that our 
‘Saying’ would be most in touch with the way things are.
For my purpose here, which is comparative, it is also vital to fully understand the 
complexity of the relation between the ‘own’ or ‘homely’, and the ‘other’, ‘foreign’, 
or ‘unhomely’ (unheimlich) as it unfolds in Heidegger’s Hölderlin’s Hymn “The 
 Ister.” Heidegger’s idea of a self is not about a mere appropriation or incorporation 
of the other. The other as other is not to be overcome in this way; it is the encounter 
that matters, so that “the law of the encounter (Auseinandersetzung) between the 
foreign and one’s own is the fundamental truth of history” (Heidegger 1996, p. 49; 
German added).
This perennial encounter is exactly what certain poets’ works show us, espe cially 
Hölderlin’s. As Heidegger says in a section on the Antigone in Hölderlin’s Hymn 
“The Ister”: “What is worthy of poetizing in this poetic work is nothing other than 
becoming homely in being unhomely” (Heidegger 1996, p. 121). And elsewhere in 
the same volume on Hölderlin he says that “The appropriation of one’s own is only 
as the encounter (Auseinandersetzung) and guest-like dialogue with the foreign” 
(p. 142; italics in original, German added). Note that the encounter in these passages 
is always the Auseinandersetzung that has been discussed.
To conclude this rather lengthy deliberation on logos, Heidegger relates logos 
to other terms such as ‘clearing’, ‘Saying’, Auseinandersetzung, and polemos, and 
through this reading offers a possibility for seeing logos as a different kind of ground-
ing that is really not the same as it is understood in traditional metaphysics, because 
it consists in finding a discourse suitable for letting things be in their relations to 
other things, in focusing on the interplay of things rather than on their essentiality. 
This means that difference and the interplay of differences is constitutive for any con-
stancy, which would be relative to this more originary play. Con-frontation or Ausein-
andersetzung in dialogue is the more originary ‘begetter’ of things. It is this difference 
that grounds, that gathers things together in their originary relatedness. Connected to 
this understanding of the processual nature of the world and of ourselves, Heidegger 
in On the Way to Language says the following, after having denounced the superfi-
cial translations of dao and our superficial understanding of the word ‘way’: “Yet Tao 
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could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think what 
reason, mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say — properly, by their proper na-
ture” (Heidegger 1971b, p. 92). Rather than understanding such a statement as point-
ing to a metaphysical or transcendental principle, Heidegger perceives logos not as 
making things identical, but as bringing forth a unity that binds everything together, 
and it does so through what he calls the ‘proper’ use of language. In relation to this 
we can think of another of Heidegger’s key terms, Ereignis, or the ‘event of appropri-
ation’. Such events of appropriation of things are really only possible through lan-
guage, where everything comes into its own by being related to everything else. As 
such, according to Heidegger, Ereignis “can no more be translated than the Greek 
λγο or the Chinese Tao” (Heidegger 1974, p. 36). What is needed is a different 
understanding of language.
A Non-Metaphysical Understanding of Dao
I now want to turn to Daoism. I will argue that we can find similar ideas in Daoism, 
especially in the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing. In chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi one 
of the provisional names for dao is offered as “Peace-in-Strife” (Watson 2003, p. 79). 
A. C. Graham translates the characters as “[a]t home where it intrudes” and the fol-
lowing sentence as “[w]hat is ‘at home where it intrudes’ is that which comes about 
only where it intrudes into the place of something else” (Graham 2001, p. 87). In 
Wing-tsit Chan’s translation the characters read “tranquillity in disturbance” (Chan 
1963, p. 196). Behind each of these translations lies a similar idea: only within and 
through the process of change can there be found a relative stability, so that again this 
stability is only a function of the more originary play of differences. Dao is the name 
for this relative stability, and in this context Hall and Ames argue:
The experience of dao is of something without borders. There is no sense of the unity of 
the world, no feeling that “all things are one.” The fundamental sense of things is of “this” 
and “that.” Only thises and thats exist as discriminable items. Where a Daoist celebrates 
her oneness with all things, the meaning of “oneness” is “continuity” with other things, 
not “identity.” (Hall and Ames 1995, p. 233)
So in ways similar to Heidegger’s understanding of logos, dao is also not concerned 
with making things identical, but with bringing things together in their difference. 
As a Daoist, one should reflect how things are. As the Book of Changes tells us: 
“The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way (Tao)” (Chan 1963, 
p. 266). Similarly, in chapter 62 of the Daodejing we hear: “Way-making (dao) is the 
flowing together of all things (wanwu)” (Hall and Ames 2003, p. 173). The way the 
world unfolds is as a continuous cycle of processes generated by conflicting forces. 
Yet seeing these forces purely as opposite is inherently flawed, as they eventually 
belong together, and can only function because of this togetherness.
And seeing such dynamics as something we should oppose is equally counter-
productive. Rather than go against the processual nature of the world, the Zhuangzi 
argues that we should embrace it:
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Go side by side with the sun and moon,
Do the rounds of Space and Time.
Act out their neat conjunctions,
Stay aloof from their convulsions.
Dependents each on each, let us honour one another.
(Graham 2001, p. 59)
In this way, Daoism also promotes the same thoughtful acknowledgment of being in 
the world that Heidegger seems to suggest. This can also be glanced from a number 
of chapters in the Daodejing (specifically 25, but it can also be read in 34, 42, and 
62) that seek to portray dao as the unchanging whole of change. Within this whole, 
things are always reversing, returning, growing, and degenerating, and this is the 
sense in which logos necessarily entails polemos, especially if we relate logos to the 
notions of concealing and unconcealing. As such, dao is similar in that it is also con-
sidered to be the workings of these yin-yang forces.
Graham Parkes already noticed a striking similarity between the Daoist yin-yang 
dichotomy, or rather dynamic, on the one hand and the notions of ‘strife’ (Streit, 
 polemos) in Heidegger on the other (Parkes 1984, p. 361). In Heidegger’s world such 
a view is put across in the following way: “Strife (Streit) is essential being (Wesung) 
of the ‘in-between’ (Zwischen)” (Heidegger 1989, p. 265; my translation, italics in 
original, German added). Such an understanding of ‘strife’ is nothing other than the 
logos-as-polemos perspective we have already encountered, which also portrays 
Heidegger’s unconcealing and concealing relationship. Reminiscent of this is the 
Daoist pair of you 有 and wu 無. As chapter 2 of the Daodejing tells us: “Determi-
nacy (you) and indeterminacy (wu) give rise to each other” (Ames and Hall 2003, 
p. 80). Anything determinate, or, in Heidegger’s terms, any being (Seiendes), only 
arises out of indeterminacy, or Being /Nothing. This interplay between you and wu 
is really all there is, and there is no need to postulate some metaphysical principle 
behind it. The interplay just is spontaneously. The same idea of spontaneity and fol-
lowing the interplay of differences that we see in the coming and going of things can 
be read in various chapters of the Daodejing, for example chapters 16, 25, and 40. 
To me this is what makes logos and dao comparable. Both notions focus on following 
the ‘logic’ of the interplay of different things on the one hand and the temporal struc-
tures of arising and decaying on the other. Or, as Zhuangzi says:
The Way is without beginning or end, but things have their life and death — you cannot 
rely upon their fulfillment. One moment empty, the next moment full — you cannot de-
pend on their form. The years cannot be held off; time cannot be stopped. Decay, growth, 
fullness, and emptiness end and then begin again. It is thus that we must describe the plan 
of the Great Meaning and discuss the principles of the ten thousand things. The life of 
things is a gallop, a headlong dash — with every movement they alter, with every moment 
they shift. What should you do and what should you not do? Everything will change of 
itself, that is certain! (Watson 2003, pp. 104–105)
There is nothing other than continuous transformation, and humans are no exception 
to this transformation; neither are humans somewhere outside this process, nor is 
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there an overarching principle behind it all. The regularity in the process is not some-
thing other than the process.
A similar passage where Zhuangzi puts this idea forward is the following:
Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, willfulness, 
 candor, insolence — music from empty holes, mushrooms springing up in darkness, day 
and night replacing each other before us, and no one knows where they sprout from. Let 
it be! Let it be! (Watson 2003, p. 33)
There really is no reason to think that we should be asking for a guiding principle that 
would be directed to some end. Instead we should just let the process run its natural 
course:
Then the four seasons will rise one after the other, the ten thousand things will take their 
turn at living. Now flourishing, now decaying. . . . At the end, no tail; at the beginning, no 
head; now dead, now alive . . . [,] its constancy is unending, yet there is nothing that can 
be counted on. (Watson 1968, pp. 156–157)
The Alpha-to-Omega teleology typical of Western thinking and conducive to an in-
vention of a ‘First Cause’ or ‘origin’ that would see logos as a metaphysical principle 
that can be ‘counted on’ is absent in most classical Chinese thought, but especially 
in Daoism, because dao as the process itself does not aim at anything, and its ‘con-
stancy’ is nothing more than constant change. To follow the dao would then be noth-
ing else than to be able to follow the ever changing equilibrium between yin and 
yang forces, something which can also be read in chapter 11 of the Zhuangzi, where 
the “dark and mysterious gate” (Watson 1968, p. 120) associated with dao is exactly 
the passage from yang to yin (and of course this passage is reversible). Or again in 
chapter 42 of the Daodejing, where dao is also understood as the continuous balanc-
ing of ever changing yin and yang sides.
Logos, Dao, Relationality
As we have seen, Heidegger explained logos as ‘discourse’ and the fundamental 
meaning of discourse as “letting something be seen” (Heidegger 1962, pp. 55–56). 
Seeing how a ‘letting-be-seen’ always, as unconcealment, contains concealing, we 
can understand logos as the discourse that lets things be seen as the interplay of 
 unconcealing and concealing. As such, dao, which is similarly translatable as ‘dis-
course’, is also a letting things be seen as they are in their relationality to what they 
are not. In a different, but related way, Heidegger explains the related concept of 
physis as Fuge, Fügung in the sense of Harmonia.17 Heidegger’s translation of Frag-
ment 8 of Heraclitus is the following: “Das Gegen-fahren ein Zusammenbringen 
und aus dem Auseinanderbringen die eine erstrahlende Fügung” (Heidegger 1994a, 
p. 145). Translation of this Heideggerian jargon is difficult: “The reciprocal play a 
bringing together, and from the distinction the one shining jointure” would be my 
loose translation. Heidegger understands Gegen-fahren as the play of differences, 
which is at the same time a bringing together of differences as well as a distinguish-
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ing of differences, understood from the idea of ‘jointure’, which is nothing else than 
the space between things filled up by their necessary interaction — in other words, 
Auseinandersetzung. Difference and jointure belong together, though in a non- 
hierarchical way. This way of thinking is also found in Daoism. The title of the second 
chapter of the Zhuangzi, “The Sorting that Evens Things Out,” explains how sorting 
out can be seen as both differentiating and equalizing (qi 齊), which we can then 
read in comparison to Auseinandersetzung or Das Selbe (the ‘same’).
So logos and dao are discourse, and both are impermanent structures that we 
need and live by. Chad Hansen has argued extensively for seeing dao more from its 
linguistic connections. Dao is guiding discourse; it is speaking, signaling, leading. 
Both notions convey the idea that we are actively participating in the construal of the 
world and our place in it. As Heidegger says: “Thinking cuts furrows into the soil of 
Being” (Heidegger 1971b, p. 70). Or in the words of Hansen: “to understand the 
notion of a dao or a way is to see the continuity between road-making, path-marking, 
drawing a map, or writing a list of directions” (Hansen, in Mou 2003, p. 212). Both 
the Daoists and Heidegger are extremely aware of the shortcomings of their respec-
tive societies’ current views of language, and both try to redirect us toward a different 
understanding of language that would take us closer to our world. This indeed con-
stitutes a similarity between them, but there is also a divergence between Heidegger 
and Daoism here. The Daoists do constantly remind us of the provisionality of lan-
guage, but Heidegger seems to believe at least that some fundamental words have 
something extra (this was also part of Derrida’s criticism of Heidegger). While the 
Daoists seem perfectly happy with the way things are, one cannot help feeling that, 
for Heidegger, there is more at stake. He does suggest that words such as ‘Being’ do 
or could have some fundamental import. Maybe this is exactly that point where 
Heidegger remains chained, although minimally, to the metaphysical tradition, 
whereas Daoism was never wedded to such a tradition in the first place.
However we understand this, logos and dao are discourse, and that means they 
are our dialogue with the world. If there is any similarity, then it is in the idea that 
we must start to listen to what is, and not try to dominate the conversation by impos-
ing artificial structures on it. As such one could perceive a similarity between the 
metaphysical tradition of the West and the Confucian tradition. Both, although with 
ultimately different goals, seek to impose artificial ways upon the world, whereas 
Heidegger and the Daoists seek to undo this imposition. In connection to this, 
Zhuangzi says quite clearly that it is wrong “To wear out the daemonic-and- 
illuminated in you deeming them to be one without knowing that they are the same” 
(Graham 2001, p. 54). Here I find a striking resemblance to Heidegger’s earlier asser-
tion that the ‘same’ and the ‘identical’ are two very different things. We deem things 
to be one, but instead we should be realizing they are the same. Whereas for others 
the world of change seems in need of overcoming, Heidegger and Zhuangzi find in 
the world of change and difference all they require for understanding and appreciat-
ing our existence.
Both Heidegger’s Heraclitus and Daoists, then, suggest an attunement to what is 
larger than mere beings, without that larger ‘thing’ becoming a metaphysical prin-
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ciple, and they consequently advocate some way of thinking that accords rather than 
imposes. Such a form of responsiveness that Heidegger and Zhuangzi proclaim is not 
devoid of meaning, but is ultimately a form of responsibility: to follow the injunctions 
to let things be as they inherently are. As such, dao can be understood as the work-
ings of different forces, and that is the sense in which dao is transformation, and in 
which logos necessarily entails polemos.
Taking one step further we could apply these findings to the idea of comparative 
philosophy itself. My interpretation involves a different way of reading and writing. 
Language in comparative philosophy is special; it is extremely important since we 
are dealing with multiple languages and multiple functions of these languages 
and thus with different views. Here, especially the idea of ‘belonging-together-in- 
difference’ with which Heidegger translates τ ατ, or ‘the same’, das Selbe, which 
we have already encountered, cannot be stressed enough in relation to comparative 
philosophy. This is exactly what I understand Heidegger’s strategy in comparative 
philosophy to be about: to treat different cultures as belonging together through dif-
ference and diversity. And to find the discourse or language appropriate to bring out 
these differences in dialogue is the real challenge of comparative philosophy. We 
should always be on guard against imposing ideas through language, and this means 
that on the one hand we should treat language with the utmost respect while on the 
other hand we must not hesitate to exploit and widen languages to the fullest to make 
them speak to us.
We have known for some time now that the classical Chinese thinkers had  largely 
different background assumptions. For example, it is now commonplace to state that 
there is no real creator entity in classical Chinese thought, and that the metaphysical 
notions of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ are largely absent as well.18 The assumed equiva-
lents you and wu rather mean ‘present’ and ‘absent’, or ‘having’ and ‘not-having’. 
Most of the classical Chinese assumptions fit in more with a process-oriented world-
view than with one that is based on a metaphysical and onto-theological one. As 
such, we would be well off to be more careful when interpreting concepts such as 
dao in familiar metaphysical ways. Maybe a non-metaphysical reading as presented 
here is more relevant to classical Chinese philosophy, and such considerations can 
also lead us, like Heidegger, to reassess our own most important notions, like logos, 
and, equally important, might give us resources to understand better the Chinese 
philosophical tradition, which is generally conceived as non-metaphysical in the 
sense that I have described. The strategy I have taken can lead us to a more positive 
assessment of the similarities of classical Chinese thought and the classical Western 
thought of the Presocratic thinkers. As such, the general understanding that the his-
tory of Western philosophy is largely metaphysical might be right from Plato onward, 
but that would mean there is a whole field of inquiry and comparison waiting be-
tween the Presocratics and classical Chinese thinkers. It is my sincere belief that the 
so-called postmodern thinkers (in which I include the likes of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
and Derrida) and their approaches to the Presocratics can offer particularly suitable 
alternative strategies of reading the Chinese classics.
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Notes
1   –   In what follows, I shall use a rather narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ 
that consists of this particular kind of thought that aims at understanding the 
world through non-material and transcendental principles of the ‘first ground’ 
type, in full awareness that the term ‘metaphysics’ covers much more than just 
this.
2   –   Quoted from Hall and Ames 1998, p. 153.
3   –   Although the term ‘metaphysics’ itself has a long history and is complicated to 
narrow down, Derrida’s following definition reasonably describes metaphysics 
the way I am using it here:
The enterprise of returning “strategically,” ideally, to an origin or to a “priority” held to 
be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms 
of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All metaphysicians, from Plato 
to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this way, conceiving good to be 
before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple 
 before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imita-
tion, etc. And this is not just one metaphysical gesture among others, it is the metaphys-
ical exigency, that which has been the most constant, most profound and most potent. 
(Derrida 1988, p. 236)
4   –   See, e.g., his ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik’ in Heidegger 1994b, pp. 67–95.
5   –   As such, Heidegger’s thinking on the Presocratics has always insisted on seeing 
them not as imperfect precursors to the metaphysical tradition, but as mostly 
non-metaphysical thinkers in their own right. The name Presocratics is already 
a misnomer that assumes we can understand the earlier thinkers by reference to 
the later ones. It is such misunderstandings that Heidegger sought to overcome, 
and the same thing applies to my arguments here.
6   –   See Zhuangzi chapter 2, in Watson 2003, pp. 34–36; Graham 2001, pp. 52–53; 
Chan 1963, pp. 182–184.
7   –   Herrlee Creel, in his reading of the first chapter of the Daodejing, disagrees that 
it is substantial. See Creel 1983, p. 302.
8   –   See, e.g., Heidegger’s On the Way to Language (Heidegger 1971b, p. 92).
9   –   See also Heidegger 1994a, p. 251.
10   –   See ibid., pp. 250–251.
11   –   “ Λγο wäre, als die lesende Lege gedacht, das griechisch gedachte Wesen 
der Sage. Sprache wäre Sage. Sprache wäre: versammelndes vorliegen-Lassen 
des Anwesenden in seinem Anwesen. In der Tat: die Griechen wohnten in 
 diesem Wesen der Sprache. Allein sie haben dieses Wesen der Sprache niemals 
gedacht, auch Heraklit nicht” (italics in original, German added to translation).
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12   –   The German original from Einführung in die Metaphysik (Heidegger 1953, 
p. 47) goes: “Auseinandersetzung is allem (Anwesendem) zwar Erzeuger. . . .” 
(translation modified from Maly and Emad 1986, p. 41).
13   –   In German: “allem aber (auch) waltender Bewahrer” (Heidegger 1953, p. 47).
14   –   Heidegger added this comment in parenthesis in the 1953 edition.
15   –   In German, in Heidegger 1994b, p. 371:
der Λγο, den Heraklit als den Grundzug des Anwesens denkt, die Μορα, die Par-
menides als den Grundzug des Anwesens denkt, das Χρεν, das Anaximander als das 
Wesende im Anwesen denkt, nennen das Selbe. Im verborgenen Reichtum des Selben 
ist die Einheit des einenden Einen, das   Eν von jedem der Denker in seiner Weise 
 gedacht.
16   –   See Vetsch 1992, p. 81.
17   –   See Heidegger 1994a, pp. 141–147.
18   –   See, e.g., Hall and Ames 1995, p. 11.
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